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JUDICIAL FACT-FINDING: TRIAL BY JUDGE ALONE IN
SERIOUS CRIMINAL CASES
VICKI WAYE∗
[The ability to choose between trial by jury and trial by judge alone in some jurisdictions presup-
poses a rational basis for exercising the choice. In this article, the author examines judicial fact-
finding modalities from comparative and systemic perspectives. The conclusion drawn is that both
judicial fact-finders and lay fact-finders process their decision-making similarly. In both instances,
fact-finding involves the assimilation of disparate and sometimes complex information. In each case,
the drawing of inferences is, of necessity, dependent upon heuristic reasoning. Furthermore, the
application of principles of law to proven facts is inexact. However, there are a number of inbuilt
safeguards in judicial fact-finding that promote rationality and inhibit cognitive illusion.]
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I   INTRODUCTION
There have been a number of studies undertaken that compare the role of judge
and jury as fact-finders in criminal cases.1 The primary purpose of these studies
has been to evaluate the jury as an arbiter of justice. Such evaluation has
occurred by benchmarking decision-making by jury against decision-making by
judges and other legal professionals. Consequently, the studies have been
premised upon the notion that judicial decision-making is more likely to accord
with the law and its rationales. On a positivist conception of the law, that premise
is not ill-founded. Judges are expected to make their decisions when facts are
found that come within the rubric of normative standards located in statutes and
judicial precedent. The propriety of judicial decision-making is evaluated in
terms of the judiciary’s fidelity to this role. Being accountable on this basis, it is
contended that judges take a less personalised view of the parties and the cases
that appear before them than do lay jurors.2 By contrast, jurors who are neither
part of, nor allied to, the officialdom of the court system bring their own personal
values to the decision-making process. Jurors are not constrained by legal
reasoning. Indeed, unlike judges,3 jurors are not required to provide any logically
coherent and compelling reasons for their decisions.
However, there are difficulties in characterising judges as impersonal mouth-
pieces of the law. If this were so, there would be no need for provisions designed
to prevent ‘judge shopping’ in statutes that permit an accused to elect to proceed
to trial by judge alone.4 While judges must provide reasons that conform to
applicable normative standards, there is considerable scope for individual
differentiation among the judiciary.
Judicial approaches to decision-making in serious criminal cases can vary on a
number of interrelated levels: systemic; interpretation and application of
normative standards; and fact-finding.
The purpose of this article is to examine judicial fact-finding processes. The
examination is undertaken in the context of the accused’s right to elect to
1 Harry Kalven Jr and Hans Zeisel, The American Jury (1966); John Baldwin and Michael
McConville, Jury Trials (1979); Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg, ‘Trial by Jury or
Judge: Transcending Empiricism’ (1992) 77 Cornell Law Review 1124; John Jackson and Sean
Doran, Judge without Jury: Diplock Trials in the Adversary System (1995); Reid Hastie and W
Kip Viscusi, ‘What Juries Can’t Do Well: The Jury’s Performance as a Risk Manager’ (1998) 40
Arizona Law Review 901; Richard Lempert, ‘Why do Juries Get a Bum Rap? Reflections on the
Work of Valerie Hans’ (1998) 48 DePaul Law Review 453; Neil Vidmar, ‘The Performance of
the American Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective’ (1998) 40 Arizona Law Review 849; Ros-
selle Wissler, Allen Hart and Michael Saks, ‘Decisionmaking about General Damages: A Com-
parison of Jurors, Judges, and Lawyers’ (1999) 98 Michigan Law Review 751; Shari Seidman
Diamond and Neil Vidmar, ‘Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics’ (2001) 87 Virginia
Law Review 1857; Jury Research Institute, Jury Deliberations: What Goes on behind Closed
Doors (2002) <http://www.jri-inc.com/article3.htm>.
2 Jackson and Doran, Judge without Jury, above n 1, 223.
3 As to the United States, see Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure r 23(c). As to Australia, see
Fleming v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 250; R v Keyte (2000) 78 SASR 68; R v Murphy [2000]
NSWCCA 297 (Unreported, Spigelman CJ, Grove and Kirby JJ, 23 August 2000); Criminal
Code (WA) s 651B(2); Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 133(2); Supreme Court Act 1933
(ACT) s 68C(2).
4 See Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 132(4); Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 68B(1)(c);
Criminal Code (WA) s 651A(4).
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proceed to trial by judge alone in serious criminal cases. This context is a
particularly useful one because the judicial participants have a unique ability to
compare their role as an arbiter of the law and as an arbiter of the facts and the
law.
The examination also compares judicial fact-finding in diverse jurisdictions. A
comparison of the work of the judiciary in bench trials in two different jurisdic-
tions provides an indication of the importance of cultural or environmental
factors in the fact-finding process. Accordingly, discussion of the varying
approaches taken by the judiciary to the above tasks begins from this systemic
perspective. The two jurisdictions chosen for examination are:
1 South Australia, where trial by judge alone has been available since 1984;
and
2 Oregon, United States, where the right to waive jury trials has been recog-
nised in courts exercising federal jurisdiction since the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Patton v United States5 in 1929 and in state cases
under the Oregon Constitution since 1932.6
The article then goes on to examine the fact-finding processes adopted by the
judiciary in each jurisdiction, noting the contribution of behavioural science
studies to legal decision-making.
II   WHEN CAN THE DEFENDANT ELECT TO PROCEED BY JUDGE
ALONE?
A  Australia
As a result of the constitutional requirement for trial by jury of Commonwealth
indictable offences,7 defendants can only elect to be tried by judge alone when
charged with a state indictable offence.8 Four Australian state jurisdictions
permit persons prosecuted with serious criminal charges to choose trial by judge
alone. These jurisdictions are: South Australia;9 New South Wales;10 Australian
Capital Territory;11 and Western Australia.12
In South Australia,13 New South Wales14 and the Australian Capital Terri-
tory,15 the trial judge must be satisfied that the accused has received advice from
a legal practitioner in relation to the decision to proceed by judge alone.
5 281 US 276 (1930).
6 Constitution of Oregon art 1, § 11.
7 Australian Constitution s 80.
8 Brown v The Queen (1986) 160 CLR 171.
9 Juries Act 1927 (SA) s 7.
10 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 132.
11 Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 68B.
12 Criminal Code (WA) s 651A–C.
13 Juries Act 1927 (SA) s 7(1)(b).
14 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 132(1)(b).
15 Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 68B(1)(b).
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B  Oregon
In the United States, as in Australia, most criminal justice activity occurs at the
state, rather than at the federal, level. It is estimated that state courts hear 85–95
per cent of criminal cases.16 The constitutional right to waive a jury trial in state
matters only applies to non-capital cases. Unlike proceedings in federal matters,
the prosecution has no right to veto a defendant’s election to proceed without a
jury.17
III   THE DECISION TO PROCEED BY JUDGE ALONE
In Kalven and Zeisel’s seminal work, The American Jury,18 several factors
were listed as influential upon the defendant’s decision to waive a jury in a
criminal case: regional custom; crime category; defendant’s character; media;
process; and nature of defence.
A  Regional Custom
Kalven and Zeisel noted that regional custom was the primary determinant and
that custom in respect of jury waiver varied enormously between American
states.19 For the purpose of this article, the author studied statistics from the
Oregon Circuit Court in Eugene, Oregon and from the Adelaide Registry of the
South Australian District and Supreme Courts. In the Oregon Circuit Court,
which exercises state jurisdiction over criminal matters, approximately 30 per
cent of trials proceed as bench trials.20 In the South Australian District and
Supreme Courts, by contrast, only three to five per cent of serious criminal trials
are heard by judge alone.21
B  Crime Category
Kalven and Zeisel found a correlation between crimes with a high rate of
guilty pleas and trials that proceeded by judge alone.22 Where a guilty plea was
16 Gerald Robin, Introduction to the Criminal Justice System (3rd ed, 1987) 186.
17 State v Baker, 976 P 2d 1132 (Or, 1999).
18 Kalven and Zeisel, above n 1, 24–30. See also Orville Richardson, ‘Jury or Bench Trial?
Considerations’ (1983) 19(9) Trial 58.
19 For example, in Wisconsin and Connecticut, defendants chose to proceed by judge alone in
75 per cent of cases, whereas in Montana and the District of Columbia, trial by jury was hardly
ever waived. More recent figures outlining regional variations in the United States are set out in
Sean Doran, John Jackson and Michael Seigel, ‘Rethinking Adversariness in Nonjury Criminal
Trials’ (1995) 23 American Journal of Criminal Law 1, 8–11. Similar regional variations have
also been observed in Canada: see Lee Stuesser, ‘Lawyers Judge the Jury’ (1990) 19 Manitoba
Law Journal 52, 62–3.
20 Based on records supplied by Laura Ritenour, Administrative Analyst, Oregon Circuit Court,
Eugene, Oregon (copy on file with author).
21 Based on records at the Criminal Registry, South Australian District and Supreme Courts,
(summary on file with author). This figure accords with New South Wales Bureau of Crime
Statistics and Research data on New South Wales, where the accused may also elect to proceed
by judge alone (copy on file with author).
22 See also Stephen Schulhofer, ‘Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?’ (1984) 97 Harvard Law Review
1037, 1062–4, associating high bench trial rates with the willingness of local trial judges to give
discounted sentences in exchange for jury waiver.
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likely because of the type of crime charged, jury waiver was also likely. Crime
category was also relevant where the type of crime charged was likely to
engender negative sympathy toward the defendant. For example, Kalven and
Zeisel noted that sexual crimes against women and children were more likely to
be tried by judge alone.23 This is confirmed by figures obtained from the
Criminal Registry of the South Australian District and Supreme Courts, and also
from comparative figures from New South Wales superior courts. Approximately
25 per cent of cases heard by judge alone in these jurisdictions involved some
form of sexual assault.24
C   Defendant’s Character
Defendants with known prior convictions were more likely to choose trial by
judge alone than those defendants without criminal antecedents.25
D  Media
Defendants were likely to choose trial by judge alone where preceding media
publicity might render the jury unsympathetic.26 Traditionally, judges have been
regarded as less affected by prejudicial material than jurors in determining the
guilt of an accused.27
Nevertheless, there have been warnings that intuitive views regarding judicial
immunity to community pressure may be over-sanguine. Cases that engender
community outcry because of their shocking facts are likely to place difficult
fact-finding burdens on judges whose opinions are later open to scrutiny and
criticism when reasons for judgment are published.28
E  Process
Other authors have noted that matters related to process might also be relevant,
especially in jurisdictions that experience a high rate of trial by judge alone.29
The cost and delay associated with a jury trial were regarded as a deterrent to
jury trial, particularly where the accused was in custody awaiting trial.
23 Paradoxically, sexual assault cases which turn on issues of consent or identity are also
considered ideal fact-finding cases for a jury: Stuesser, above n 19, 74. Stuesser noted that where
there were no aggravating factors, such as use of violence or multiple assailants, Canadian
lawyers tended to advise clients to opt for a jury trial: at 74.
24 Statistics on file with author. An earlier study also found that trials involving sexual assaults
comprised a majority of the cases heard by judge alone: Carolyn Harrison, ‘Redefining Justice?:
Trial by Judge Alone’ (unpublished paper, undated) (copy on file with author).
25 Kalven and Ziesel, above n 1, 24; Justice J Badgery-Parker, ‘The Criminal Process in Transition:
Balancing Principle and Pragmatism — Part II’ (1995) 4 Journal of Judicial Administration 193,
198.
26 Kalven and Ziesel, above n 1, 24; John Willis, ‘Trial by Judge Alone’ (1998) 7 Journal of
Judicial Administration 144, 153–4.
27 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Criminal Procedure: The Jury in the Criminal
Trial, Report No 48 (1986) 101; Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Review of the
Civil and Criminal Justice System in Western Australia, Report No 92 (1999) 257–60.
28 Willis, above n 26, 154.
29 See, eg, Stuesser, above n 19, 72.
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Conversely, in South Australia, the right of the prosecution to appeal against
an acquittal procured by way of a bench trial30 constitutes a procedural deterrent
against jury waiver. The prosecution may only appeal against the sentence where
a conviction has been procured by a jury verdict.31 The prosecution cannot
appeal against a jury acquittal. By contrast, in Oregon, the state’s right of appeal
is limited to matters arising from the validity of the accusatory instrument and
errors related to the pre-trial suppression of evidence.32
F  Nature of Defence
If the defence raised by the accused was a ‘technical’ defence based upon a
narrow application of black letter law, lawyers were often more prepared to
advise an election for a bench trial.33
IV  FEATURES OF  THE JUDICIARY
Much of the information discussed in this article is drawn from a survey of
several judges from the Circuit Court in Eugene, Oregon and from the South
Australian District Court and Supreme Court. A copy of the survey questions and
a summary of responses are attached to the article.34 The survey was undertaken
on a voluntary basis and was directed toward judges who had participated in
bench trials in serious criminal cases. Five judges from the Circuit Court in
Eugene, Oregon, four judges from the District Court of South Australia and two
judges from the Supreme Court of South Australia participated by way of
personal interview with the author. All judges who took part in the survey did so
on the condition that their identities would not be disclosed. Notes of the
interviews are on file with the author.
A  Court Structure
1  Eugene, Oregon: Circuit Court
The Circuit Court in Eugene, Oregon is a superior court of general state juris-
diction, which extends to cases involving serious criminal charges. It comprises
15 judges, 11 of whom are male and four of whom are female. Circuit Court
judges are elected on a non-partisan ballot and sit for terms of six years. To be
eligible for election, the Circuit Court candidate must be a United States citizen,
a member of the Oregon State Bar,35 a resident of Oregon for at least three years
and a resident in the relevant judicial district for at least one year.36
The jurisdiction of the Circuit Court in Eugene is much smaller in population
and geographic area than the District and Supreme Courts of South Australia.
30 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 352(1)(ab).
31 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 352(1)(a)(iii).
32 OR REV STAT § 138.060(2) (2001).
33 Stuesser, above n 19, 72.
34 See below Part VIII.
35 OR REV STAT § 3.050 (2001).
36 OR REV STAT § 3.041 (2001).
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Eugene’s population is 137 000. The Circuit Court in Eugene services Lane
County, Oregon, which has a total population of 323 000.
2 South Australia: District Court and Supreme Court
The District Court and Supreme Court of South Australia are located in Ade-
laide, the capital of South Australia. These courts also travel on circuit to Mount
Gambier and Port Augusta, other regional South Australian centres.
The District Court comprises 19 judges, one of whom is female. The District
Court is South Australia’s primary trial court, exercising jurisdiction over civil
claims, criminal charges, administrative review and criminal injuries claims. It
has jurisdiction to hear serious criminal matters except for murder and treason.
There are 14 judges who sit in the Supreme Court, one of whom is female. The
Supreme Court is the highest court of South Australia. It exercises both original
and appellate jurisdiction. It can hear serious criminal charges and has exclusive
jurisdiction to try murder and treason charges.
B   Judiciary
1 South Australia
As a result of the manner of their appointment, the protocol surrounding their
office, and the lack of understanding within the community regarding the nature
of their work, South Australian judges seem more remote from the life and
culture of the average person than their Eugene counterparts. Judges in the
District Court and Supreme Court are formally appointed by the South Austra-
lian Governor, acting on advice from the South Australian executive.37 The
Attorney-General, a member of the South Australian government, puts forward
initial nominations for appointment.
South Australian judges are appointed ‘during good behaviour’38 and can only
be removed by the Governor acting upon advice from both houses of Parlia-
ment.39 Otherwise judges must retire at 70 years of age.40 The average age of
Australian judges is 59 years.41
Traditionally, the Australian judiciary has been distant from the public. Judges
presiding over criminal trials in the District and Supreme Courts are formally
robed and wear horsehair wigs. They sit in an elevated position at the front of the
court behind a high bench.42 Robing, wigs and the bench preserve anonymity
and thus independence.
When not sitting in court, judges speak to outsiders through their staff. District
Court and Supreme Court judges have secretaries and associates. Supreme Court
justices also have tipstaves. Judges are further protected by a contingent of
37 James Crawford, Australian Courts of Law (3rd ed, 1993) 61.
38 Constitution Act 1934 (SA) s 74.
39 Constitution Act 1934 (SA) s 75.
40 District Court Act 1991 (SA) s 16; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 13A.
41 Robert Thomson, The Judges (1987) 41. See also Enid Campbell and H P Lee, The Australian
Judiciary (2001) 283.
42 Thomson, above n 41, 30.
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security staff. Although this phalanx of staff is necessary for judicial productivity
and security, it further distances the judiciary from the community.
The South Australian community itself knows little about the work of the
courts and of the judges. The jury system in criminal trials provides only a
limited form of democratic participation in the administration of justice. Other-
wise, most people enjoy modest contact with courts. Education about the rule of
law and the role of legal institutions is limited to an elective final year subject at
high school.
The distancing of Australian judges from the community is emphasised by the
elite backgrounds of most judges. Approximately 80 per cent attended private
schools.43 The overwhelming majority of judges are white and male.44 Conse-
quently, the Australian judiciary has historically been identified as an elitist
establishment.
Perversely, the view that Australian judges are elitist has not changed as the
judiciary has become more activist. Cases such as Mabo v Queensland [No 2]45
and Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh46 have led to
criticism that judges are implementing ‘judicial reform’ without the mandate of
democratic election.47 Far from endearing the judiciary to the public, the failure
to conform to a conservative agenda has led to accusations that the judiciary is
‘out of touch’ with the realities of everyday Australian life.48 Australians, who at
least pay lip service to the spirit of egalitarianism,49 regard elitism with disdain,
whether due to conservative politics or intellectual radicalism.
South Australian courts have taken a number of steps to reduce the distance
and alienation between the judiciary and the public. A public information office
has been created to explain the role of the courts. Judges now participate in
media interviews and arrangements can be made for them to speak to community
groups.50 School children can address their questions about the legal system
directly to judges through a website entitled ‘Ask the Judge’.51 The South
43 Ibid 38–9.
44 Sean Cooney, ‘Gender and Judicial Selection: Should There Be More Women on the Courts?’
(1993) 19 Melbourne University Law Review 20. See also Margaret Thornton, Dissonance and
Distrust: Women in the Legal Profession (1996) 294; Campbell and Lee, above n 41, 25, 281.
45 (1992) 175 CLR 1. This case established common law recognition of native title to land.
46 (1995) 183 CLR 273. This case established that administrative decision-making was subject to
Australian international treaty obligations.
47 See, eg, Chief Justice David Malcolm, ‘The Garran Oration’ (2001) 60(3) Australian Journal of
Public Administration 3.
48 Greg Craven, ‘Judicial Activism in the High Court — A Response to John Toohey’ (1999) 28
University of Western Australia Law Review 214; Chief Justice Murray Gleeson, ‘Legal Oil and
Political Vinegar’ (1999) 73(5) Law Institute Journal 50. The author, however, does not agree
with the proposition that judges should be responsive to community attitudes. Judicial independ-
ence requires that judges apply the law freely and without fear or favour.
49 John Braithwaite, ‘Economic Policy: What the Electorate Thinks’ in Jonathan Kelley and Clive
Bean (eds), Australian Attitudes: Social and Political Analyses from the National Social Science
Survey (1988) 26, 32.
50 Courts Administration Authority of South Australia, Speakers <http://www.courts.sa.gov.au/
community/index.html>.
51 Courts Administration Authority of South Australia, Ask the Judge
<http://www.courts.sa.gov.au>.
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Australian Courts Administration Authority has also hosted community forums
about the role of the courts and judiciary.52
2 Eugene
Compared with residents of Eugene, however, the majority of South Austra-
lians remain less informed about the role and work of the judiciary. The judiciary
in Eugene is better known in the community because of Eugene’s comparatively
small size and the professional profile of its population. Moreover, education
about the role and work of the judiciary is universal and not confined to a small
percentage of high school students.53 Education about the judiciary has also been
established for much longer than in South Australia. Indeed, the law and the
invocation of legal rights are far more ingrained in American culture than in
Australian culture.54
C  The Judiciary and the Bar
Given that legal advice is crucial to the decision to waive jury trial,55 there are
also important differences in the relationship between the judiciary and the Bar
between the two jurisdictions. The size of the Bar in Eugene compared to
Adelaide is small, and Eugene judges are well known to both prosecution and
defence counsel. Moreover, given their mode of appointment, judges in Eugene
are less likely to be perceived as associated with partisan politics than South
Australian judges, who are appointed by the government.
When surveyed about their relationship with counsel in criminal bench trials,
Eugene judges were of the view that the preservation of judicial neutrality and
party control of the proceedings in the traditional adversarial sense56 were highly
important. Judicial intervention and managerialism were frowned upon as
inconsistent with the right to due process, particularly in the criminal context.
While judges from Eugene conceded that in civil trials they would be more likely
to intervene if counsel was not presenting a party’s case well, on the whole they
were adamant that this was not appropriate in a criminal case. For example,
judges from Eugene felt it was inappropriate to question witnesses directly
except to clarify ambiguity in testimony, which would occur rarely. They felt it
inappropriate to impose time limits for questioning or suggest whether an issue
should be pursued or not. At most, incompetent counsel might be taken aside for
the judge to suggest a different focus.
On the other hand, the behaviour of a South Australian judge in criminal
matters tended to correlate with his or her behaviour in civil matters. A judge that
tended to be interventionist in civil cases also tended to display similar charac-
52 Courts Administration Authority of South Australia, ‘Courts Consulting the Community’ (Press
Release, 9 November 2000).
53 All Eugene high school children learn about the role of the judiciary in ‘American Studies’, a
subject within social studies.
54 Kermit Hall, William Wiecek and Paul Finkelman, American Legal History: Cases and
Materials (2nd ed, 1996) 574.
55 Stuesser, above n 19, 53.
56 Jill Hunter and Kathryn Cronin, Evidence, Advocacy and Ethical Practice: A Criminal Trial
Commentary (1995) ch 2.
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teristics, albeit less markedly, in criminal bench trials. Similarly, a judge that
tended to adopt a traditional, neutral role in civil cases also tended to adopt a
neutral role in criminal bench trials. Those judges who displayed interventionist
tendencies indicated that they were more likely to ask witnesses questions in
bench trials than in jury trials. They also felt more comfortable directing counsel
to pursue an issue in bench trials.
The lack of any distinct practice for trial by judge alone in South Australia
probably accords with the very low rate of bench trial overall. Trial by judge
alone is so rare that South Australian judges have not developed a distinct style
of procedure, as observed by Doran and Jackson in Northern Ireland.57
D  Cultural Factors
Eugene and Adelaide share many cultural features:
• a democratic political system dominated by liberal politics;
• a large, well-educated middle class;
• a frontier, pioneering history;
• a well-established and well-patronised arts community; and
• an economic base which historically relied upon agriculture and resources
but which has diversified into other industries, such as manufacturing, elec-
tronics and chemicals.
However, Eugene’s population is more homogenous and professionalised than
the population serviced by the District and Supreme Courts of South Australia.
Ninety per cent of the population in Eugene is white non-Hispanic.58 A high
percentage of the population is comprised of doctors, lawyers, architects and
educators. The University of Oregon and the Hult Center for Performing Arts
play a central role in Eugene’s cultural life.
Adelaide has a population of 1 067 300 people or 73 per cent of the total state
population.59 Approximately 22 per cent of people living in Adelaide were born
overseas, with the majority of those coming from European countries.60 Ap-
proximately 14 per cent of the population has a tertiary qualification.61
Eugene’s more professionalised demographic may partly explain the higher
rate of bench trial in the Lane County Circuit Court, compared with the very low
rate of bench trial in South Australia. The Eugene judiciary is far more likely to
identify with, and consequently not be as alienated from, a highly professional-
ised population than their South Australian counterparts.
57 Jackson and Doran, Judge without Jury, above n 1, ch 7. See also John Jackson and Sean Doran,
‘Conventional Trials in Unconventional Times: The Diplock Court Experience’ (1993) 4 Crimi-
nal Law Forum 503, 513.
58 Social Science Data Analysis Network, Segregation: Neighborhood Exposure by Race,
CensusScope <http://www.censusscope.org/us/s41/p23850/chart_exposure.html>.
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V  APPROACHES TO APPLICATION OF LEGAL STANDARDS
Very few modern legal philosophers would agree that the application of legal
standards by the courts is a simple process of fitting rules to facts.62 If that were
so, then different judges would make identical decisions in like cases63 and the
dispensation of justice would become a mechanised process. On the contrary,
there is a considerable body of academic literature contending that the applica-
tion of legal rules by judges combines both discretionary and rules-based
elements.64 Consequently, the claim that judges cannot readily depart from legal
rules, whereas juries can, requires examination.
When considering the application of legal rules by any fact-finder, the first
matter to note is that the application of legal rules and the fact-finding process
cannot easily be separated. The process of fact-finding is generated by the legal
principles that the parties ultimately hope to persuade the fact-finder to apply.
Legal standards determine the appropriate method of proof. They confine the
scope of significant facts and the relative weight that should be given to particu-
lar facts. They also determine what legitimate inferences may be drawn from
facts and conjunctions of fact to produce other factual and legal conclusions.
Furthermore, the fact-finding process involves interpretation in light of knowl-
edge about the law and the legal system within which that fact-finding occurs.
Even where factual matters have equivalent well-grounded meaning in other
fields of knowledge, the method by which they are used by the fact-finder
becomes transformed by the legal setting. The deviation between the legal
concept of intention and its equivalent moral meaning in the community evi-
dences this phenomenon. Intention in the criminal law refers to the defendant’s
willingness to commit the conduct elements of an offence.65 This is distinct from
a desire to bring about the result that the proscribed conduct produces. For
example, when one is drinking heavily, the known consequence is a hangover.
Yet it would be unusual for a heavy drinker to intend to produce a hangover.
Usually the heavy drinker is seeking the pleasure and relaxation associated with
alcohol or, in extreme cases, alcoholic oblivion. In criminal law, intention in
these circumstances would affix to the drinker’s intention to imbibe alcohol. But
62 Frederic Reynold, The Judge as Lawmaker (1967); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (revised ed,
1999); Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1978) 14–80; Richard Ingleby and Richard
Johnstone, ‘Judicial Decision Making’ in Rosemary Hunter, Richard Ingleby and Richard
Johnstone (eds), Thinking about Law: Perspectives of the History, Philosophy and Sociology of
the Law (1995) 174.
63 Experience dictates otherwise: see, eg, T S Palys and Stan Divorski, ‘Judicial Decision-Making:
An Examination of Sentencing Disparity among Canadian Provincial Court Judges’ in Dave
Müller, Derek Blackman and Anthony Chapman (eds), Psychology and Law: Topics from an
International Conference (1984) 333, 339. This study concludes that the great disparity observed
in the sentencing decisions of Canadian judges was largely due to differences in values regard-
ing deterrence and protection versus rehabilitation. See also Jorge Sobral Fernández, ‘An En-
quiry into Judicial Decisions’ in Santiago Redondo et al (eds), Advances in Psychology and
Law: International Contributions (1997) 227.
64 See Lee Ann Fennell, ‘Between Monster and Machine: Rethinking the Judicial Function’ (1999)
51 South Carolina Law Review 183; Ronald Cass, ‘Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retro-
spective Decision-Making’ (1995) 75 Boston University Law Review 941.
65 Law Book Company, Laws of Australia, vol 9 (at 23 July 2003) 9 Criminal Law Principles, ‘9.1
The Criminal Laws’ [251].
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in other, non-legal contexts, intention might be equated with a desire to bring
about a particular result. When asking why someone got drunk, for example, we
do not usually respond, ‘Because they had the intention to get to imbibe a lot of
alcohol’.66 Yet that information would be important to determine whether
someone deliberately overindulged in alcohol or was drunk because they were an
inexperienced drinker with little skill in judging their capacity to handle alcohol.
Conversely, interpretation of a legal term is subject to the cultural and social
mores of the community in which it is applied. Appellate case law shows
significant correlation between the criminal law notion of intention and the
assignment of blame. For instance, in R v Crabbe, the High Court of Australia
specifically alluded to non-morally blameworthy intention when it raised as an
example the case of a surgeon who administers medical treatment, appreciating
that death is probable as a result.67 Notwithstanding the likelihood of death, the
High Court stated that in that instance the surgeon would not have the requisite
intention to kill.68 By contrast, in R v Watson, the Queensland Court of Criminal
Appeal refused to permit the Palm Island cultural practice of allowing husbands
to physically punish disobedient wives to be used as evidence that the defendant
husband did not intend to harm his wife when he cut her with a knife.69
Philosophers have described the above as the doctrine of double effect.70
Under this doctrine, the distinction between intention and foresight is more
important to the assignment of praise than to blame. Where the act is morally
blameworthy, as in Watson, the distinction between intention and foresight is less
delineated than in the case where the act undertaken is morally praiseworthy, as
in Crabbe. Thus, a business manager who causes his or her company to pursue a
profit-making strategy that incidentally produces environmentally beneficial
effects will not have intended to cause that company to act in an environmentally
beneficial manner. However, a business manager who causes his or her company
to pursue a profit-making strategy, knowing that this will lead to environmental
harm, will be viewed as possessing the intention to cause that harm.
Any model of legal decision-making that strictly bifurcates the application of
legal rules from fact-finding is likely to mask the latent evaluative content of
legal rule application. Consequently, as it is impossible to completely disentangle
the strands of fact-finding, legal norms and social and moral decision-making, it
is difficult to mathematically model the manner in which judges, let alone juries,
make their determinations. Indeed, insofar as the application of legal principles
to the facts is concerned, there is very little evidence of the comparative rectitude
of judges and juries. Kalven and Zeisel found that judges and juries usually
66 See Bertram Malle and Joshua Knobe, ‘The Distinction between Desire and Intention: A
Folk-Conceptual Analysis’ in Bertram Malle, Louis Moses and Dare Baldwin (eds), Intentions
and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition (2001) 45, 64.
67 (1985) 156 CLR 464, 470 (Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ) (‘Crabbe’).
68 Ibid.
69 [1987] 1 Qd R 440, 464 (Dowsett J) (‘Watson’).
70 Alfred Mele, ‘Acting Intentionally: Probing Folk Notions’ in Bertram Malle, Louis Moses and
Dare Baldwin (eds), Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition (2001) 27,
29–30.
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agreed on trial verdicts.71 This was also the view of the judges from Oregon and
South Australia when questioned about any jury verdicts with which they
disagreed. Most indicated that there were no, or only very rare, occasions when
they disagreed with the jury verdict.
Some of the literature arguing in favour of jury decision-making has posited
that juries can militate against harsh results caused by the inflexible application
of legal rules.72 For example, jurors may refuse to enforce repugnant laws or
refuse to enforce the law where the result may conflict with community values.73
Yet, in the absence of jury accountability, it is difficult to determine whether this
form of ‘jury equity’ is based upon morally proper considerations or, as one
author puts it, simply upon the charm of counsel in the case.74 Moreover, juror
nullification may also yield obverse results: a jury convicting or acquitting upon
a morally objectionable basis.75
Judges from Eugene and South Australia diverged when discussing whether
they felt constrained to produce a verdict consistent with a strict application of
the law. Eugene judges expressed stronger fidelity to a strict application of the
law than their South Australian counterparts. The Eugene judges made it clear
that if there were a divergence between the law and what they viewed as a just
outcome, they would apply the law regardless. Nonetheless, it was unclear
whether the Eugene judiciary ever found itself in the position of having to do so.
The views expressed by the judges could therefore reflect perceived expectations
of their proper role, rather than actual practice. However, because these views
were expressed so strongly, this may be a ground for a different view of judicial
performance in bench trials by defendants and their counsel. If defendants and
their counsel believe that judges may convict or acquit on a different basis to lay
fact-finders, this provides an explanation for choosing to proceed by bench trial,
whether or not the judiciary conform to these expectations.
In South Australia, judges tended to be more relaxed about problems associ-
ated with a divergence between the law and ‘justice’. They tended not to regard
the law as an overly constraining factor when applying the law to the facts.
Rather, the South Australian judges expressed the view that they could fashion
71 Kalven and Ziesel, above n 1, 63–4. See also Clermont and Eisenberg, above n 1, 1152–6; Marc
Galanter, ‘The Civil Jury as Regulator of the Litigation Process’ [1990] University of Chicago
Legal Forum 201, 204–5.
72 Mark Findlay et al, Jury Management in New South Wales (1994) 8; Mark Findlay, Stephen
Odgers and Stanley Yeo, Australian Criminal Justice (2nd ed, 1999) 152–3.
73 Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Review of the Criminal and Civil Justice System
in Western Australia: Consultation Drafts (1999) 927.
74 Penny Darbyshire, ‘The Lamp that Shows that Freedom Lives — Is It Worth the Candle?’
(1991) Criminal Law Review 742, 751. In a report prepared by the International Society for the
Reform of Criminal Law, it was reported that juries would routinely fail to act upon ‘compelling
police evidence’ in the English courts in the 1970s because of community views of police ‘ver-
balling’ and ‘planting’: International Society for the Reform of Criminal Law, Jury Project
Discussion Paper (2000) 15.
75 See, eg, R v Young [1995] QB 324. In this case, the Court of Appeal received affidavit evidence
from all 12 jurors that while housed overnight in a hotel during their deliberations, four of the
jurors indulged in an ouija board seance to contact the deceased victim to find out whether the
defendant was guilty of murder.
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the application of the law to their own view of a proper outcome.76 They
expressed the view that the law was sufficiently open-ended to produce a just
result when required. For South Australian judges, the law itself was just and
therefore tended to produce a just outcome. As a result, there was little or no
conflict between its application and their personal mores.
The divergence of opinion between the two groups of judges is ironic given
that South Australian judges are required to provide substantive written reasons
for their verdicts that are open to appellate dissection and review,77 whereas
Eugene judges are not. The wider basis of appellate review regarding the
application of the law does not, it appears, cause South Australian judges to feel
that they are limited in how they should apply the law.
In fact, both approaches disguise judicial subjectivity. In the first instance, the
Eugene judges appear to be abrogating responsibility where notions of justice
and the law do not coincide. By embracing legalism as justification for failing to
do justice, Eugene judges project that social justice does not lie within their
mandate. In the second instance, by equating law and justice, South Australian
judges project that individual judgment about appropriate outcomes becomes
sublimated within the institutional framework of the law. Individualistic depar-
ture from the text of the law runs counter to the ideal of judicial legitimacy.
While jurors, who remain anonymous representatives of the people, are expected
to act according to conscience, the rhetoric of judicial authority requires other-
wise.
However, while judges produce written reasons that accord with the terms of a
pertinent legal text, there is no evidence that they adopt a less normative ap-
proach to the application of legal rules than jurors. To contend that judges are
merely conduits for a fixed legal text presupposes a number of untenable
assumptions: that the relevant legal rules can be identified with clarity;78 a
particular legal rule does exist for every given fact situation;79 the law comprises
a set of systematic, logical and inherently coherent rules;80 once a legal rule has
been identified, its application to the proven facts is necessarily straightfor-
ward;81 and knowledge of past events is perfectly attainable through the process
76 See Duncan Kennedy, ‘Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology’
(1986) 36 Journal of Legal Education 518 for an exposition of the relationship between the
application of legal rules and the judge’s personal preferences.
77 R v Winner (1995) 79 A Crim R 528, 534 (Kirby ACJ, Newman J, Barr AJ). Failure to give
sufficient reasons amounts to an error of law: see, eg, R v Keyte (2000) 78 SASR 68; R v Green
(2001) 78 SASR 463; R v McKenzie [2001] SASC 279 (Unreported, Olsson, Perry and Gray JJ,
31 August 2001).
78 In areas of evolving common law, for example, there may be a number of conflicting precedents
and no clearly identifiable legal principle.
79 As a result of historical development, there may be no rule to apply to novel situations.
80 The common law method generates rules on a case by case basis. The function of the judge in
the common law system is to render justice, not to formulate a series of social norms. There is
no mechanism for ensuring that legal rules comprise a set of systematic, synergistic and logically
coherent body of norms: see René David and John Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World
Today: An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law (3rd ed, 1985) 360–1. Rules with vary-
ing rationales commonly overlap and provide different remedies, for example, the intersection of
contract, tort and trade practices law in many commercial cases.
81 Legal rules are not individuated. To fulfil their function as useful limits and guides, legal rules
must be generalised and open-ended: see William Twining and David Miers, How to Do Things
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of proof.82 Within the scope of the adversarial presentation of facts, the bounds
of precedent and the limits of the judicial mandate, the act of judgment is a
creative act.83 Reasons for judgment enable judges to persuade others of the
propriety of their decision-making84 and facilitate accountability rather than
devotion to an immutable text.
VI   FACT-FINDING
It is a trite observation that the marshalling, assimilation and digestion of
evidence into determinations of fact are complex and difficult processes. Like all
forms of complex decision-making, judicial fact-finding requires the integration
of multiple, fallible, incomplete and conflicting items of evidence to draw
inferences about past events. Evidence garnered on an ex post facto basis is
neither true nor false, but uncertain. Inferences linking evidence do not depend
on empirically validated assumptions, but upon commonsense knowledge
constructed according to experience and learning. Conclusions are not merely the
sum of each individual item of evidence and the inferential links between them.
They are dependent upon the variable weight attached to each item of evidence
and the relative strength of the inferential links between the evidence, as well as
the plausibility of the overall narrative of each party’s case. Determining the
weight that should be attached to evidence, and the relative reliance that ought to
be placed on various inferences, cannot be objectified because the probabilities
underpinning the inferences are unknown.85
Moreover, there are few benchmarks to determine whether a fact-finding
decision is good or bad. In South Australia, appeals from bench trials are
with Rules (4th ed, 1999) 200–4. Consequently, the application of any legal rule to a proven fact
situation must depend on the decision-maker’s judgment regarding the meaning of the rule and
its fit to the situation. For example, a legal rule may prohibit being drunk in a public place. A
decision-maker may be required to determine the following: is a driveway leading onto a road
once it passes the footpath maintained by the local council a public place? Does having a blood
alcohol level of .08 constitute being drunk? Does being drunk require the exhibition of certain
behaviour? If so, what sort of behaviour?
82 Our knowledge of past events is uncertain. The process of proof can only provide a limited
understanding of past events because of the delay between the event and trial, the adversarial
generation and presentation of evidence, and the courtroom setting and rules of evidence and
procedure regarding how facts may be proven.
83 Justice Michael Kirby, The Judges (1983) ch 5.
84 Sandra Berns, To Speak as a Judge: Difference, Voice and Power (1999) 60–3.
85 For example, if a witness testified that the gun used to kill the victim was a .22 rifle with a
silencer, we would only be able to estimate vaguely the correctness of that statement by refer-
ence to the witness’s experience with guns, the distance between the witness and the gun, the
witness’s veracity and so on. We would not be able to assign a probability to that evidence other
than in the most general terms; it is more probable than not that the witness is telling the truth
and is not mistaken, or it is highly probable or highly improbable that the witness is telling the
truth and is not mistaken. See also Laurence Tribe, ‘Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual
in the Legal Process’ (1971) 84 Harvard Law Review 1329. Contra Michael Saks and Robert
Kidd, ‘Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics’ (1980) 15 Law and
Society Review 123, 123–60. The authors reject the notion that evidence is case-specific. They
argue that most evidence is far more probabilistic than judges realise and that the veracity of
evidence such as eyewitness testimony, fingerprints and so on can be accurately determined
from base rate information rather than on a case-specific basis.
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available if the appellant86 can identify matters which affect the nature and
quality of the evidence before the trial judge to the extent that the Court of
Criminal Appeal is not convinced of the verdict beyond reasonable doubt.87 The
Court of Criminal Appeal will intervene where the verdict is unreasonable in the
sense that, having regard to the evidence, no other reasonable fact-finder would
have arrived at that verdict. In Eugene, appeals are available on a similar basis,88
either because conviction upon insufficient evidence constitutes an error of
law,89 or because it violates the constitutional right of due process.90 To survive
appeal in either jurisdiction, therefore, the verdict must be rational.
Rationality emphasises the robustness of the decision-making process and also
requires a substantive analysis of the content of the verdict. A rational decision
will be logical and internally coherent, will be unaffected by the manner in
which the decision-maker’s choice is portrayed91 and should incorporate
probabilities so as to produce the best outcomes.92
86 Either the defendant can appeal against conviction or the prosecution can appeal against
acquittal: Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 352.
87 R v Hetherington (Unreported, Supreme Court of South Australia, Court of Criminal Appeal,
Nyland, Mohr and Debelle JJ, 24 August 1994). However, no reversal is available on the basis
of credibility findings unless it was wrong in law for the trial judge to rely on credibility as the
basis for the verdict: see, eg, State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Earthline Constructions
Pty Ltd (in liq) (1999) 160 ALR 588, 620–2 (Kirby J); Williams v Minister, Aboriginal Land
Rights Act 1983 (1999) 25 Fam LR 86 (Supreme Court of New South Wales); Williams v Minis-
ter, Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 [2000] Aust Torts Reports ¶81-578, 64 136 (Spigelman CJ,
Sheller and Heydon JJA) (New South Wales Court of Appeal); Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nomi-
nees [No 2] Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424, 437–8 (Drummond, Mansfield and Allsop JJ);
Tapp v Thamer [2002] ACTSC 86 (Unreported, Miles CJ, 29 August 2002).
88 See, eg, US v Armstrong, 253 F 3d 335 (8th Cir, 2001); US v Cruz, 285 F 3d 692 (8th Cir, 2002).
These are federal cases, but the test employed is the same in state jurisdictions.
89 State v Gladstone, 474 P 2d 274 (Wash, 1970). In this case, the Court found that the jury should
not have convicted the defendant of aiding or abetting a crime on the basis of insufficient evi-
dence of knowledge and intent. In Oregon, appeal is only available with respect to errors of law
that substantially affect the rights of the parties: OR REV STAT § 138.220 (2001).
90 Fabritz v Traurig, 583 F 2d 697 (4th Cir, 1978). In this case, the Court found insufficient
evidence to support a finding that the defendant had knowingly abused her child. The case arose
on a habeas corpus petition rather than on appeal.
91 See, eg, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, ‘Choices, Values, and Frames’ in Terry Connolly,
Hal Arkes and Kenneth Hammond, Judgment and Decision Making: An Interdisciplinary
Reader (2nd ed, 2000) 147, 150–2. The authors use the following example:
The US is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual disease that without treatment is expected to
kill 600 people. The following sets of choices are postulated:
Choice 1:
• If treatment program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
• If treatment program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 will be saved
and a two-thirds probability that no-one will be saved.
Choice 2:
• If treatment program C is adopted, 400 people will die.
• If treatment program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will die
and a two-thirds probability that 600 people will die.
A rational decision maker would identify that A=C and B=D. However, irrationally most people
(72 per cent) choose A in Choice 1 and D (78 per cent) in Choice 2.
92 For example:
Choice A: a one in 1000 chance of losing $5000.
Choice B: a sure loss of $10.
The expected payoff from Choice A is -$5, which clearly outweighs Choice B (-$10). However,
Plous notes that, irrationally, four out of five respondents prefer the sure loss because of a ten-
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Modern scholarly approaches to decision-making also focus upon the norma-
tive content of decision-making, or at least a combination of normative content
and robustness of decision-making processes.93 Definitions of rationality that
focus solely upon decision processing may not necessarily produce good
decisions. A decision-maker may think rationally on the basis of irrational
assumptions.94 For example, as a result of delusion, a person may believe that
aliens or secret government agents are pursuing them. However, the person
concerned may still make rational decisions for coping with this imagined
situation. Moreover, departure from the ‘logic of rationality’ may quite properly
reflect an individual’s particular circumstances. For example, over-weighting of
whether a decision is framed as a loss or a gain may be significant to a risk-
averse individual. Consequently, current literature argues that a decision is
‘good’ if, apart from displaying internal consistency and coherence, it:
1 reflects basic principles of survival and adaptation;95
2 reflects actively open-minded thinking that facilitates choosing the best
possibility;96
3 produces outcomes that are empirically accurate,97 and do not depart mark-
edly from actual probabilities;98 and
4 survives ex post facto intuitive examination.99
A decision is bad if, after it is made, the decision-maker wishes that he or she
had not made it.
When it comes to judging the consequences of real human behaviour, the
continued popularity of jury trials indicates that empathy, rather than cold, hard
rationality, is the desired criterion of decision-making. Yet the studies by
behavioural scientists on legal decision-making by judges and juries100 have
dency to overweight the chances of a large loss: Scott Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and
Decision Making (1993) 99. See also Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, ‘Prospect Theory:
An Analysis of Decision under Risk’ (1979) 47 Econometrica 263.
93 Reid Hastie, ‘Problems for Judgment and Decision Making’, (2001) 52 Annual Review of
Psychology 653, 660.
94 Jonathan Baron, Thinking and Deciding (1988) 29.
95 Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, ‘Are Humans Good Intuitive Statisticians after All? Rethinking
Some Conclusions from the Literature on Judgment under Uncertainty’ (1996) 58 Cognition 1;
Gerd Gigerenzer, ‘Rationality: Why Social Context Matters’ in Paul Baltes and Ursula Staud-
inger (eds), Interactive Minds: Life-Span Perspectives on the Social Foundation of Cognition
(1996) 319.
96 Baron, above n 94, 31.
97 Kenneth Hammond, Human Judgment and Social Policy: Irreducible Uncertainty, Inevitable
Error, Unavoidable Justice (1996); Kenneth Hammond, ‘Coherence and Correspondence Theo-
ries in Judgment and Decision Making’ in Hal Arkes and Kenneth Hammond (eds), Judgment
and Decision Making: An Interdisciplinary Reader (2000) 53, 95.
98 For example, in a roulette game, the odds of winning on red are 1:1. Yet people are more likely
to bet on black following a succession of red wins: see Saks and Kidd, above n 85, 217.
99 Herbert Simon, ‘Alternative Visions of Rationality’ in Paul Moser (ed), Rationality in Action:
Contemporary Approaches (1990) 189, 200–3.
100 See, eg, W Lance Bennett and Martha Feldman, Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom:
Justice and Judgment in American Culture (1981); Saks and Kidd, above n 85; Willem
Wagenaar, Peter van Koppen and Hans Crombag, Anchored Narratives: The Psychology of
Criminal Evidence (1993); Bernard Jackson, ‘“Anchored Narratives” and the Interface of Law,
Psychology and Semiotics’ (1996) 1 Legal and Criminological Psychology 17; Chris Guthrie,
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tended to focus upon departures from rationality models that focus upon the
decision-making process rather than the latter, more normative, means of
evaluation.101
In a landmark study conducted by Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich,102 several
common cognitive illusions were identified in judicial decision-making. Similar
cognitive illusions had already been identified in earlier studies of jury deci-
sion-making.103 These illusions included: anchoring;104 framing;105 hindsight
bias;106 representativeness heuristic;107 and egocentric bias.108
Jeffrey Rachlinski and Andrew Wistrich, ‘Inside the Judicial Mind’ (2001) 86 Cornell Law
Review 777.
101 This approach has recently been criticised by Gregory Mitchell, ‘Taking Behavioralism Too
Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law’ (2002) 43
William & Mary Law Review 1907.
102 Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich, above n 100.
103 See, eg, Robert MacCoun, ‘Experimental Research on Jury Decision-Making’ (1989) 244
Science 1046; Gretchen Chapman and Brian Bornstein, ‘The More You Ask for, the More You
Get: Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts’ (1996) 10 Applied Cognitive Psychology 519; Reid
Hastie, David Schkade and John Payne, ‘Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Hindsight Effects on
Judgments of Liability for Punitive Damages’ (1999) 23 Law and Human Behavior 597.
104 Anchored decision-makers adjust insufficiently from anchor values. In the Guthrie, Rachlinski
and Wistrich study, above n 100, 790–2, groups of judges were asked to fix damages in a per-
sonal injury suit. One group was told that the defendant had made an application to have the suit
dismissed because the claim did not meet the jurisdictional minimum of US$75 000. The appli-
cation was without merit. Nonetheless, the group of judges who were informed of the defen-
dant’s application, on average, fixed damages at a lower amount than the group of judges who
were not given any information other than details of the plaintiff’s injuries and how they were
incurred.
105 Under framing, decision-makers tend to respond differently depending upon whether the
problem is formulated as a choice between making a gain or making a loss. In the Guthrie,
Rachlinski and Wistrich study (ibid 796–7) different groups of judges were asked whether a suit
should be settled for a certain amount from either the defendant’s or the plaintiff’s perspective.
Judges in both groups (plaintiff or defendant) were presented with economically identical infor-
mation, but from the plaintiff’s perspective the settlement was framed as a gain and from the
defendant’s perspective the settlement was framed as a loss. Approximately 40 per cent of
judges in the plaintiff’s group felt the plaintiff should accept the settlement, while only 25 per
cent of judges in the defendant’s group felt that the defendant should settle the case.
106 Hindsight bias describes the tendency to assign higher probabilities to an event in retrospect than
would be assigned in advance of the event. In the Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich study (ibid
801–3) different groups of judges were given divergent information about an appellate court’s
decision. One group was told that the appellate court had affirmed the lower court’s decision.
One group was told that the appellate court had vacated the lower court’s decision. One group
was told that the appellate court had imposed a different sanction. When the judges were asked
whether they would have affirmed the lower court’s decision, 81.5 per cent of the group told that
the appellate court had affirmed indicated they would have predicted that result. On the other
hand, of the group told that the appellate court had vacated the lower court’s decision, only
27.8 per cent would have affirmed. Similarly, only 40.4 per cent of those told that the appellate
court imposed a different sanction would have affirmed the lower court’s decision.
107 Representativeness heuristics refers to the tendency of people to judge probabilities by the
degree to which the evidence being analysed is representative of a category. One important
consequence of representativeness heuristics in legal decision-making is that sample behaviour
is expected to be highly representative of a parent population. Reliance on representative heuris-
tics leads people to ignore ‘base rate’ information (the relative frequency with which an event
occurs). In the Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich study (ibid 808–10) judges were asked to de-
termine whether a defendant had negligently injured the plaintiff. In the scenario outlined, the
plaintiff was injured after being struck by a barrel being loaded from the defendant’s hoist into a
warehouse. The judges were told that (1) when barrels are negligently secured there is a 90 per
cent chance they will break loose; (2) when barrels are properly secured they break loose only
one per cent of the time; and (3) workers negligently secured barrels only one in 1000 times.
Applying that information, the conditional probability that the defendant is negligent given the
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When considering the application of their study to courtroom decision-making,
Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich felt that, despite the necessary qualifications
that have to be made when transplanting experimental responses to real life
situations, their study was accurate in its portrayal of the thought processes used
by judges.109 However, there are a number of reasons to doubt that view. First, in
South Australia at least, judges are required to provide written reasons for their
decisions. The requirement of written reasoning encourages rational deci-
sion-making in both the traditional and more normative senses because it allows
depth of review, recourse to decisional tools and other forms of reality testing
absent from the quick brain teasing exercises outlined in the behavioral science
experiments. Moreover, although the judiciary in Eugene is not required to
provide written reasons, when questioned about their decision-making, Eugene
judges indicated that they wrote extensive notes and tended to adopt similar
checking upon their reasoning that they would employ if their reasoning was
published.
Most judges indicated that they felt limited when engaged in the fact-finding
process. In South Australia, the requirement to provide written reasons was
regarded as a constraint because the basis for all primary fact-finding had to be
made transparent by clear reference to the evidence. Further, the basis upon
which evidence was found to be persuasive and accepted by the judge also had to
be stated. In turn, this reasoning had to be strongly related to the discharge of the
burden of proof. Some of the judges in Eugene further indicated that their
fact-finding discretion was strongly constrained in favour of the presumption of
innocence and that, where a fact-finding discretion could be exercised, it was
employed in favour of the defendant.
The requirement of written reasons also ensured against irrelevant or otherwise
inadmissible material being taken into account and thus guarded against inap-
propriate anchoring. Even though Eugene judges were not required to publish
written reasons, all judges from South Australia and Eugene stated that, as a
result of their legal training, they were able to disregard irrelevant and/or
inadmissible material. Judicial legal training included examination of the
rationale of the evidential requirement of relevance and of the evidentiary rules
of exclusion. For example, through this understanding, judges felt that they were
better placed to discount hearsay because the dangers of hearsay evidence, such
as distortion and confabulation, were the subject of critical examination in their
legal education.110
plaintiff’s injury is 8.3 per cent. Yet over 40 per cent of judges determined that the likelihood
that the defendant was negligent given the plaintiff’s injury to be between 76 and 100 per cent.
In other words, the group of judges who over-inflated the odds of negligence placed too much
weight upon (1) and insufficient weight upon (2) and (3).
108 Egocentric bias refers to the tendency of people to make judgments about themselves and their
abilities that are self-serving. In one study, for example, judges tended to overestimate the de-
gree to which the lawyers appearing before them felt fairly treated: see Theodore Eisenberg,
‘Differing Perceptions of Attorney Fees in Bankruptcy Cases’ (1994) 72 Washington University
Law Quarterly 979, 983–7.
109 Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich, above n 100, 819.
110 Empirical research indicates that lay jurors, in fact, give little weight to excluded evidence such
as hearsay: see Peter Miene, Roger Park and Eugene Borgida, ‘Juror Decision Making and the
Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence’ (1992) 76 Minnesota Law Review 683; Richard Rakos and
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Second, the behavioural science experiments were presented as neatly pack-
aged problems where the intermediate facts underlying the ultimate findings that
the judges were required to make were presented definitively, rather than as
items of evidence subject to the rigour of adversarial examination and rebuttal by
way of contrary evidence. The judges subject to these experiments lacked the
benefit of hearing divergent views, of testing the evidence, and of access to other
evidence and base rate information which they would normally enjoy. In this
respect, the experiments were designed to elicit error.111 Given the many
differences between the manner in which facts are presented at trial, it would be
wrong to assume that performance on one type of problem will be the same for
another type of problem. Actual reasoning processes are content-bound or
schema-bound.112
Third, the level of decision-making error recorded in the behavioural science
experiments was inflated by the representation of the problems that the judges
were given to consider in a single event versus frequency format.113 They lacked
the feedback and learning opportunities about the subject and the deci-
sion-making process of which a judge would ordinarily be apprised through the
experience of sitting on many similar cases, recourse to precedent and use of
model decision-making formats.
In the judges’ views, juries were less constrained in their fact-finding function.
As a result, the judges felt that evidential rules excluding prejudicial material
were more important in jury trials than in bench trials. From the judicial per-
spective, it was the absence of accountability through the publication of reasons,
rather than the frailty of lay decision-making, that justified common law eviden-
tial exclusionary rules in jury trials.114
Rationality in the non-normative sense cannot provide an effective benchmark
to evaluate judicial and lay decision-making for several other reasons. First, it
cannot accurately depict commonsense knowledge and reasoning115 where the
probabilities governing the relationship between facts and inference remain
inexact and consequently unarticulated. Second, models of rationality cannot
easily incorporate default reasoning; that is, the use of hypotheses or assump-
Stephen Landsman, ‘Researching the Hearsay Rule: Emerging Findings, General Issues, and
Future Directions’ (1992) 76 Minnesota Law Review 655. This type of research has led Damaska
to conclude that professional judges may also easily misvalue excluded evidence such as hear-
say: Mirjan Damaska, Evidence Law Adrift (1997) 30–2. Damaska argues that the absence of
accountability through the publication of reasons rather than the frailty of lay decision-making
justifies common law evidential exclusionary rules: at 41–6.
111 Lee Roy Beach, Jay Christensen-Szalanski and Valerie Barnes, ‘Assessing Human Judgment:
Has It Been Done, Can It be Done, Should It Be Done?’ in George Wright and Peter Ayton
(eds), Judgmental Forecasting (1987) 49.
112 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, ‘On the Study of Statistical Intuitions’ (1982) 11
Cognition 123, 130–1.
113 See Cosmides and Tooby, above n 95, 17–21.
114 This is consistent with the views of Damaska when comparing bifurcated decision-making in
common law adversarial systems with unitary trial systems in civil law countries: Damaska,
above n 110, 41–6.
115 Marilyn MacCrimmon, ‘What Is “Common” about Common Sense?: Cautionary Tales for
Travelers Crossing Disciplinary Boundaries’ (2001) 22 Cardozo Law Review 1433, noting that
what constitutes commonsense varies across subgroups of the population.
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tions people are prepared to make about the world unless shown to be wrong.116
Heuristics are a necessary adjunct of complex decision-making. They enable the
decision-maker to assimilate thousands of life episodes to form a judgment in
each new individual case. Without the capacity to assimilate and incorporate
default reasoning, complex decision-making would become overwhelmingly
prolix and difficult. Third, there is no ontology to account for linguistic uncer-
tainty. Uncertainty may arise to the extent that the meaning of a term of legal
significance, such as ‘intent’ or ‘fault’, is ambiguous, or may arise from ambigu-
ity of reference.117 Rationality dependent upon the correct application of a legal
rule becomes unattainable where the legal rule itself is open-ended and variable.
Further, models of rationality cannot warrant a fact-finder’s conclusion about
witness credibility, where judgment is dependent on a complex web of optics and
sensory psychology, and knowledge of personal and human behaviour. Models
of rationality tend to assume that inferences are easily verifiable and do not
easily apply where the inferential reasoning is based on the interplay of numer-
ous observations and knowledge absorbed through experience and study.
When asked about the method in which they went about fact-finding in bench
trials, the judiciary from South Australia and Eugene answered several questions
designed to elicit whether they used Bayesian techniques.118 They were asked
questions designed to show whether they used Bayesian techniques in general,
and whether they used Bayesian techniques in relation to specific types of
fact-finding. In particular, they were asked to compare and contrast their
fact-finding techniques with respect to credibility findings and fact-finding
techniques when applied to matters of forensic expertise.
Bayesian analysis provides mechanisms for making probabilistic inferences of
the kind required by curial fact-finding.119 Using Bayesian analysis is likely to
reduce some of the cognitive illusions outlined previously because it requires the
articulation of base rate information and prevents the masking of bias and
representativeness heuristic. Moreover, because it requires information to be
presented mathematically, it also reduces the likelihood that framing will unduly
influence decision-making.
All judges questioned (whether from South Australia or Eugene) indicated that
they did not use Bayesian analysis as a general method of reviewing evidence.
They indicated that they tended to analyse evidence against a narrative view of
the case as a whole and did not calculate guilt on the basis of a combination of
the prior odds of guilt and the individual odds of each new piece of evidential
information. This approach to decision-making, commonly known as the ‘story
116 Ibid 1457–8.
117 Vern Walker, ‘Theories of Uncertainty: Explaining the Possible Sources of Error in Inferences’
(2001) 22 Cardozo Law Review 1523, 1532–4.
118 For a useful discussion on the application of Bayesian belief networks in the legal domain, see
Ward Edwards, ‘Influence Diagrams, Bayesian Imperialism and the Collins Case: An Appeal to
Reason’ (1991) 13 Cardozo Law Review 1025.
119 For a description of the application of Bayes theorem to curial fact-finding, see Andrew
Ligertwood, Australian Evidence (3rd ed, 1998) 21–32. See also C G G Aitken, Statistics and the
Evaluation of Evidence for Forensic Scientists (1995).
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model’120 of decision-making, organises, interprets and evaluates evidence
against a narrative construction of the events supplied by the parties and from the
knowledge and experience of the decision-maker. The story model of deci-
sion-making has been consistently observed among jurors and judges (and
confirmed by the participants in this survey). According to research, judges and
jurors often construct a number of stories about an event and will accept one
story as the best when it best accounts for the evidence presented at trial and is
the most coherent in the sense of being internally consistent, plausible and
complete.121 Confidence in a story is increased where the story appears to be the
only explanation of the evidence.
The failure to embrace an ‘atomistic’ model of decision-making,122 whereby
the fact-finder assigns probative weight to distinct pieces of evidence and arrives
at a final determination by aggregating or disaggregating those probabilities, is a
significant obstacle to the adoption of Bayes theorem. It seems that both judicial
and lay decision-makers find it difficult to divorce the evaluation of individual
items of evidence from overall judgment.
The survey results rejecting Bayes theorem are consistent with appellate case
law such as R v Adams123 and R v GK.124 In South Australia, use of Bayes
theorem in jury trials has been specifically disavowed in relation to DNA
evidence.125 In an influential Australian article the position has been put that
[legal] decision-making generally involves a global assessment of a whole
complex array of matters which cannot be given individual numerical expres-
sion. Such a decision depends very much more on commonsense, experience of
the world, and beliefs as to how people generally behave … than on mathe-
matical computations; and concentration on mathematical probabilities could
prejudice this commonsense process.126
When asked whether they were likely to apply probabilistic inference more
readily to forensic evidence, a small majority of judges from both jurisdictions
indicated that they did not apply probabilistic inference to forensic evidence any
more than they might apply probabilistic inference to evaluate the credibility of a
witness. A significant minority indicated that they tended to examine the
120 Richard Friedman, ‘Answering the Bayesioskeptical Challenge’ (1997) International Journal of
Evidence and Proof 276, 286; Ronald Allen, ‘Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence’
(1994) 88 Northwestern University Law Review 604; Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie, ‘A
Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model’ (1991) 13 Cardozo Law Review
519; Bennett and Feldman, above n 100, 4–10, 41–64.
121 Pennington and Hastie, above n 120, 527–8.
122 William Twining, Theories of Evidence: Bentham and Wigmore (1985) 3, 183–5.
123 [1996] 2 Cr App R 467, 482 (Rose LJ) (‘Adams’). The appellate court disapproved of the trial
judge’s explanations of Bayes theorem to a jury. The explanation was given to put DNA evi-
dence in context. However, the appellate court found that the ‘attempt to determine guilt or
innocence on the basis of a mathematical formula, applied to each separate piece of evidence, is
simply inappropriate to the jury’s task’. See also R v Doheny [1997] 1 Cr App R 369, 375.
124 (2001) 53 NSWLR 317, 323–4 (Mason P), endorsing the approach in Adams and stating that
‘[t]he process of assessing the weight of different items of evidence and reasoning to a conclu-
sion on the civil or criminal standard cannot be reduced to mathematical formulae.’
125 R v Karger (2001) 83 SASR 1, 165–6 (Mullighan J).
126 Justice David Hodgson, ‘The Scales of Justice: Probability and Proof in Legal Fact-Finding’
(1995) 69 Australian Law Journal 731, 736.
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probabilities underlying the testimony of expert witnesses more sceptically than
other forms of evidence. However, none of the judges questioned indicated that
they applied Bayes theorem to test those probabilities. That view is understand-
able given the difficulty of determining the posterior odds of guilt or innocence
in light of the other evidence presented.
Traditional judicial rejection of base rate information and focus upon individu-
alistic judgment are obstacles to the adoption of Bayes theorem in legal deci-
sion-making. Although base rate information is accepted for certain types of
evidence, the relevance of which is dependent upon the relative frequency of
samples in the population (such as DNA or fingerprint analysis), the courts have
traditionally rejected base rate information where it reflects more generally on
witness credibility. This stems partly from the view that the fact-finder is in the
best position to determine credibility according to demeanour and consistency of
evidence with other proven facts, and partly from the view that generalisations
about human character are unreliable.127 Except for certain evidence, such as
fingerprint or DNA analysis, base rate information is regarded as being of
marginal probative value and, given the oral nature of the trial process, likely to
add considerable cost to the proceedings.128 Consequently, evidence about the
relative frequency of mistaken identification has been rejected,129 as has evi-
dence about the likelihood of a victim of child sexual abuse maintaining a
relationship with the abuser,130 and evidence about whether persons other than
the fact-finder would also have been able to identify similarities between a
photograph and the accused.131 Conversely, individualistic evidence that reflects
on credibility such as a witness’s prior convictions is admissible,132 notwith-
standing the lack of any empirical evidence demonstrating a link between
criminal conviction and veracity.
The inability to apply base rate information to evidence means that the prob-
abilities assigned to evidential inputs using Bayes theorem cannot be determined
accurately. To atomise evaluations about specific items of evidence reliably, base
rate information confirming the inherent likelihood of the proposition the
evidence purports to confirm is required. Otherwise, the probabilities assigned to
items of evidence lacking comparison with base rate information are subjective
and non-verifiable. Even if the courts permitted access to such information, it
127 See, eg, State Government Insurance Commission (South Australia) v Laube (1984) 37 SASR
31, 33 (King CJ, Millhouse and Prior JJ): ‘the statistical fact that a particular proposition is true
of the majority of persons cannot of itself amount to legal proof on the balance of probabilities
that the proposition is true of any given individual.’
128 See Adrian Zuckerman, ‘Evidence’ [1982] All England Law Reports Annual Review 126,
128–9. See also Damaska, who argues that the concentrated nature of the oral criminal trial
raised greater concerns about limiting the fact-finder’s database than episodic proceedings:
Damaska, above n 110, 61–4.
129 R v Smith [1987] VR 907; R v Fong [1981] Qd R 90.
130 C v The Queen (1993) 60 SASR 467; R v F (1995) 83 A Crim R 502, 508–9 (Gleeson CJ, Grove
and Abadee JJ).
131 Smith v The Queen [2001] HCA 50 (Unreported, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and
Hayne JJ, 16 August 2001).
132 Aldridge v The Queen (1990) 20 NSWLR 737.
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may not be available,133 it might not be possible to transpose base rate informa-
tion from one population to another,134 or alternatively it might be conceptually
difficult to properly define the appropriate reference population.135 Some base
rates are more appropriate than others in their analogous fit to the facts of
particular cases. Clearly, the closer the analogous fit, the more valuable the base
rate information will be.
However, even assuming that reliable base rate information is available and
admissible, without the qualitative insights that emerge from Bayesian analysis
there is a significant danger that the fact-finder will misvalue it. Either base rate
information will be undervalued because of the preference of fact-finders to
focus upon subjective, non-quantifiable human factors,136 or it will be overval-
ued where the probabilities assigned are apparently overwhelming, as is the case
with much modern-day DNA analysis.137 From a policy perspective, Bayesian
analysis is inconsistent with the story model of decision-making because it
produces ‘frequentist decisions’ rather than ‘believability decisions’ as to how a
series of events unfolded.138 The general consensus is that legal fact-finders
cannot transform their beliefs about uncertain events into relative frequencies
and cannot perform the requisite probability calculations. Bayesian analysis thus
appears to be more useful as a tool of review than as a tool of first level fact-
finding.
VII   CONCLUSION
Insofar as fact-finding is concerned, there is little to distinguish the approaches
of judges and lay fact-finders. Judges are not automatons. While it is difficult to
transpose experimental data to real life decision-making, from time to time
judges will, as much as jurors, be imperfect decision-makers. Judges in both
Eugene and South Australia indicated that they tended to adhere to the ‘story
model’ of evidence evaluation and did not apply Bayesian techniques designed
to reduce reliance on heuristics and anchoring. Indeed, many of the judges
interviewed expressed a high level of confidence in jury decision-making. Given
133 Kenneth Foster and Peter Huber, Judging Science: Scientific Knowledge and the Federal Courts
(1999) 127–8 noting that, although DNA fingerprinting is an exception, even many scientific
tests that were developed in an environment lacking normal scientific and medical rigour lack
basic information about accuracy and reliability when applied to mixed populations.
134 For example, it may not be possible to transpose information about rates of HIV infection among
the adult population to HIV rates among children.
135 For example, while it might be possible to obtain information about rates of HIV infection
among the Australian population as a whole, it may not be possible to obtain information about
HIV rates among white women living in certain parts of New South Wales.
136 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, ‘On the Psychology of Prediction’ (1973) 80 Psychologi-
cal Review 237. Kahneman and Tversky devised a test where the subjects were told that 70 per
cent of the members of a group were lawyers and 30 per cent engineers. Each member of the
group was characterised as ‘a good communicator’ or ‘a person who enjoys working with num-
bers’. The subjects then had to label the members of the group as a lawyer or an engineer. De-
spite the background information about the total number of lawyers and engineers in the group,
the test subjects relied more heavily on the characterisations of the group members as ‘good
communicators’ or ‘good with numbers’ when making their choices.
137 Tribe, above n 85, 1361.
138 Paul Bergman and Al Moore, ‘Mistrial by Likelihood Ratio: Bayesian Analysis Meets the
F-Word’ (1991) 13 Cardozo Law Review 589.
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that judges and jurors tend to evaluate evidence in similar ways, this is not
surprising.
This does not necessarily mean, however, that judges and lay fact-finders are
likely to be affected by cognitive illusion on a routine basis. The group dynamic
of jury decision-making is an important systemic feature that tends to reduce
cognitive illusion.139 Group performance can enhance decision-making by
moderating the effect of biasing influences.140 Consequently, the combination of
group deliberation and the close supervision of the range of evidence available to
the jury for its decision-making act as important prophylactics against irrational
decision-making.141 The availability of appeal provides an ex post facto means
of ensuring reasonable adherence to the presumption of innocence and the
necessity of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Trial judges use techniques that avoid irrational decision-making. These in-
clude recourse to decisional tools such as precedent, reliance upon rules of proof
that direct the judge to be cautious of unreliable evidence, the use of written
reasons which direct the judge to articulate and to examine critically the infer-
ences underlying their conclusions of fact and, lastly, a sense of their own role in
the criminal justice system. Judicial recognition of the scope of their mandate to
deliver judgment according to law, while recognising that law is not a collection
of immutable rules, is an acknowledged restraint upon both the fact-finding
function and upon the manner in which legal rules are interpreted and applied to
established facts. Judges’ decisions are also subject to appeal and, where written
reasons are required, appellate review is likely to be more thorough than in lay
decision-making, where no such transparency applies.
Rather, this study confirms Kalven and Zeisel’s earlier findings142 — that the
primary determinants of the choice to proceed by judge or jury are cultural.
139 Plous, above n 92, 211–14.
140 Kamala London and Narina Nunez, ‘The Effect of Jury Deliberations on Jurors’ Propensity to
Disregard Inadmissible Evidence’ (2000) 85 Journal of Applied Psychology 932, 937. However,
see also Norbert Kerr, Robert MacCoun and Geoffrey Kramer, ‘Bias in Judgment: Comparing
Individuals and Groups’ (1996) 103 Psychological Review 687, 713, arguing that the compara-
tive level of bias between groups and individuals varies according to group size, the source and
magnitude of the bias, and the type of bias.
141 Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich, above n 100 , 827.
142 Kalven and Zeisel, above n 1, 24–30.
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VIII   APPENDICES
A  Judicial Survey
Administered to members of the Circuit Court in Eugene, Oregon, and to
members of the District Court and Supreme Court of South Australia who
volunteered to participate.
Individual survey participants will not be identified. Consequently the identity
of the author of any answer will remain strictly confidential. The answers
themselves, however, may be published.
1 In jury trials, judges are expected to appear as neutral as possible. It is
difficult to intervene too readily in an attorney’s/counsel’s presentation of the
case because interventions may influence the jury.
(a) If the attorney/counsel was presenting the case poorly in a non-jury trial,
would you feel more comfortable with questioning a witness directly than
you might in a jury trial?
(b) Would you say that your questioning of witnesses was more or less fre-
quent in non-jury trials than in jury trials?
(c) If the attorney/counsel were raising irrelevant issues in a non-jury trial,
would you feel more comfortable about prohibiting pursuit of a line of
questioning than you would in a jury trial?
2 Does your role as fact-finder justify pursuing greater clarification of the
issues than might have been presented by the attorneys/counsel?
3 Does your role as fact-finder justify eliciting further evidence from witnesses
than might have been presented by the attorneys/counsel?
4 Does your role as fact-finder justify questioning of witnesses in a
cross-examining manner?
5 When reviewing the evidence presented at trial do you:
(a) assess each piece of evidence individually and calculate its effect upon
the overall likelihood of the prosecution and defence cases, then adjust
the probability ratios as each item of evidence is adduced?; or
(b) use individual items of evidence to construct an explanation of the events
which you evaluate in terms of likelihood and coherence?; or
(c) a combination of (a) and (b)?; or
(d) none of the above?
6 If your answer to question 5 was (d), can you explain how you go about
reviewing the evidence presented at trial?
7 Do you assess credibility issues according to the plausibility and coherence
of conflicting stories of the evidence?
8 Do you apply the same approach to forensic evidence or identification
evidence?
9 If your answer to question 8 was no, can you explain how you go about
evaluating the validity of forensic evidence. For example, how would you
evaluate evidence of matching fibres of the defendant’s hair found on a
stocking mask used in a robbery?
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10 How do your skills and experience as a trial judge facilitate the assessment of
credibility issues?
11 How do your skills and experience as a trial judge facilitate the assessment of
forensic evidence?
12 Do trial judges have a more informed insight into the background of cases
than jurors?
13 Sometimes trial judges become privy to inadmissible evidence. How do your
skills and experience as a trial judge facilitate determination of liability
strictly in accordance with the evidence in this situation?
14 Do you feel you have less or more discretion than a jury in your fact-finding
role?
15 Do you feel you have less or more discretion than a jury when you are
required to apply legal principles to the facts as found?
16 Do your skills, knowledge and experience as a trial judge facilitate the
application of the law to the facts?
17 How does the obligation to provide a logically coherent and sustainable
judgment affect your fact-finding?
18 To protect individual jurors from undue influence, jury deliberations are not
subject to public scrutiny. Do you think that this affects the reliability of their
fact-finding?
19 In the past six months, have there been any jury verdicts with which you have
disagreed?
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